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Collection  de 
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Institute  for  Historical  IVflicroreproductlons  /  Institut  Canadian  de  microreproductlons  historiquas 


Technical  and  Bibliographic  Notes/Notes  techniques  et  bibiittyraphiques 


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L'Institut  a  microfilm*  le  meilleur  exemplaire 
qu'il  lui  a  M  possible  de  se  procurer.  Les  details 
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trpt   Coloured  covers/ 
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Le  titre  de  couverture  manque 

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Tight  binding  may  cause  shadows  or  distortion 
along  interior  margin/ 

La  reliure  serr^e  peut  causer  de  I'ombre  ou  de  la 
distortion  le  long  de  la  marge  IntArieure 

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Additional  comments:/ 
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This  item  is  filmed  at  the  reduction  ratio  checked  below/ 

Ce  document  est  film*  au  taux  de  reduction  indiquA  ci-dessous. 

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The  copy  filmed  liere  has  been  reproduced  thanlcs 
to  the  generosity  of: 

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The  last  recorded  frame  on  each  microfiche 
shall  contain  the  symbol  — ►  (meaning  "CON- 
TINUED"), or  the  symbol  V  (meaning  "END"), 
whichever  applies. 

Maps,  plates,  charts,  etc.,  may  be  filmed  at 
different  reduction  ratios.  Those  too  large  to  be 
entirely  included  in  one  exposure  are  filmed 
beginning  in  the  upper  left  hand  corner,  left  to 
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required.  The  following  diagrams  illustrate  the 
method: 


1  2  3 


L'exemplaire  film6  fut  reproduit  grAce  A  la 
gAnArosit*  de: 

Library  of  Congress 
Photoduplication  Service 

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conformity  avec  les  conditions  du  contrat  de 
filmage. 

Les  exemplaires  originaux  dont  la  couverture  en 
papier  est  imprimAe  sont  fiimte  en  commenpant 
par  Ie  premier  plat  et  en  terminant  soit  par  la 
dernidre  page  qui  comporte  une  empreinte 
d'impression  ou  d'illustration,  soit  par  Ie  second 
plat,  salon  Ie  cas.  Tous  ies  autres  exemplaires 
originaux  sont  filmte  en  commenpant  par  la 
premiAre  page  qui  comporte  une  empreinte 
d'impression  ou  d'illustration  et  en  terminant  par 
la  dernlAre  page  qui  comporte  une  telle 
empreinte. 

Un  des  symboles  suivants  apparaltra  sur  la 
dernidre  image  de  cheque  microfiche,  selon  Ie 
cas:  Ie  symbols  — ►  signifie  "A  SUIVRE",  Ie 
symbols  V  signifie  "FIN". 

Les  cartes,  planches,  tableaux,  etc.,  peuvent  Atre 
filmte  A  des  taux  de  reduction  difflrents. 
Lorsque  ie  document  est  trop  grand  pour  Atre 
reproduit  en  un  seul  clichA,  11  est  film*  A  partir 
de  I'angle  supArieur  gauche,  de  gauche  A  droite, 
et  de  haut  en  bas,  en  prenant  ie  nombre 
d'images  nAcessaire.  Les  diagrammes  suivants 
illustrent  la  mAthode. 


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li 


THE  KELATION  OF  SCIENTIFIC  METHOD  TO 
SOCIAL  PROGRESS. 


AN   ADDRESS 


DEUVERED  BEFORE  THE 


Phitapliical  Society  of  Waingta, 


x)ECEi^BEK  4a?ia:,  isso. 


BY 


SIMON  NEWCOMB, 


RETIRING  PRESIDENT  OF  THE  SOCIETY. 


WASHINGTON: 

JUDD  &  DETWEILER,  PRINTERS. 

1880. 


i 


w 


A 


^ 


I 


a 


THE  RELATION  OF  SCIENTIFIC  METHOD  TO 
SOCIAL  PROGRESS. 


A^ISr   A^DDRESS 


DELIVERED  BEFORE  THE 


Piosopliical  Society  of  ffasliiojton, 


X)ECE3yfl:BEia  4a?!!,  leeo. 


BY 


SIMON  NEWCOMB, 
It 

RETIRING  PRi;SlDKNT  OF  THE  SOCIETY. 


WASHINGTON: 

JUDD  A  DETWEILER,  PRINTERS. 

1880. 


am 
OCT  la  tiw 


i 


0 
I 

i 


THE  RELATION  OF  SCIENTIFIC  METHOD  TO  SOCIAL 

PROGRESS. 


Among  those  subjects  which  are  not  always  correctly  appre- 
hended, even  by  educated  men,  we  may  place  that  of  the  true 
significance  of  scientific  method,  and  the  relations  of  such  method 
to  practical  affairs.  This  is  especially  apt  to  be  the  case  in  a 
country  like  our  own,  where  the  points  of  contact  between  the 
scientific  world  on  the  one  hand,  and  the  industrial  and  political 
world  on  the  other,  are  fewer  than  in  other  civilized  countries. 
The  form  which  this  misapprehension  usuolly  takes  is  that  of  a 
failure  to  appreciate  the  character  of  scientific  method,  and  es- 
pecially its  analogy  to  the  methods  of  practical  life.  In  the  judg- 
ment of  the  ordinary  intelligent  man  there  is  a  wide  distinction 
between  theoretical  and  practical  science.  The  latter  he  considers 
as  that  science  directly  applicable  to  the  building  of  railroads,  the 
construction  of  engines,  the  invention  of  new  machinery,  the  con- 
struction of  maps,  and  other  useful  objects.  The  former  he  con- 
siders analogous  to  those  philosophic  speculations  in  which  men 
have  indulged  in  all  ages  without  leading  to  any  result  which  he 
considers  practical.  That  our  knowledge  of  nature  is  increased 
by  its  prosecution  is  a  fact  of  which  he  is  quite  conscious,  but 
he  considers  it  as  terminating  with  a  mere  increase  of  knowledge, 
and  not  as  having  in  its  method  anything  which  a  person  devoted 
to  material  interests  can  be  expected  to  appreciate. 

This  view  is  strengthened   by  the  spirit  with  which  he  sees 
scientific  investigation  prosecuted.    It  is  well  understood  on  all 
sides  that  when  such  investigations  are  pursued  in  a  spirit  really 
recognized  as  scientific,  no  merely  utilitarian  object  is  had  in  view. 
Indeed  it  is  easy  to  see  how  the  very  fact  of  pursuing  such  an 
object  would  detract  from  that  thoroughness  of  examination  which 
is  the  first  condition  of  a  real  advance.     True  science  demands  in  '. 
its  every  research  a  completeness  far  beyond  what  is  apparently  i 
necessary  for  its  practical  applications.     The  precision  with  which  ' 
the  astronomer  seeks  to  measure  the  heavens,  and  the  chemist  to 
determine  the  relations  of  the  ultimate  molecules  of  matter  has 
no  limit,  except  that  set  by  the  imperfections  of  the  instruments  of 


mwmi 


THE   RELATION   OF  SCIENTIFIC    METHOD 


research.  There  is  no  auch  division  recognized  as  that  of  useful 
and  useless  knowledge.  The  ultimate  aim  is  nothing  less  than  that 
of  bringing  all  the  phenomena  of  nature  under  laws  as  exact  as 
those  which  govern  the  planetary  motions. 

Now  the  pursuit  of  any  high  object  in  this  spirit  commands  from 
men  of  wide  views  that  respect  which  is  felt  towards  all  exertion 
having  in  view  more  elevated  objects  than  the  pursuit  of  gaiu. 
Accordingly  it  is  very  natural  to  classify  scientiste,  and  philos- 
ophers with  the  men  who  in  all  ages  have  sought  after  learning 
instead  uf  utility.  But  there  is  another  aspect  of  the  question 
which  will  show  the  relations  of  scientific  advance  to  the  practical 
affairs  of  life  in  a  different  light.  I  make  bold  to  say  that  the 
greatest  want  of  the  day,  from  a  purely  practical  point  of  view,  is 
the  more  general  introduction  of  the  scientific  method  and  the 
scientific  spirit  into  the  discussion  of  those  political  and  social  pro- 
blems  which  we  encounter  on  our  road  to  a  higher  plane  of  public 
well  being.  Far  from  using  methods  too  refined  for  practical  pur- 
poses, what  most  distinguishes  scientific  from  other  thought  is  the 
introduction  of  the  methods  of  practical  life  into  the  discussion  of 
abstract  general  problems.  A  single  instance  will  illustrate  the 
lesson  I  wish  to  enforce. 

The  question  of  the  tariff  is,  from  a  practical  point  of  view,  one 
of  the  most  important  with  which  our  legislators  will  have  to  deal 
during  the  next  few  years.  The  widest  diversity  of  opinion  exists 
as  to  the  best  policy  to  be  pursued  in  collecting  a  revenue  from 
imports.  Opposing  interests  contend  against  each  other  without 
any  common  basis  of  fact  or  principle  on  which  a  conclusion  can 
be  reached.  The  opinions  of  intelligent  men  differ  almost  as  widely 
as  those  of  the  men  who  are  immediately  interested.  But  all  will 
admit  that  public  action  in  this  direction  should  be  dictated  by 
one  guiding  principle — that  the  greatest  good  of  the  community  is 
to  be  sought  after.  That  policy  is  the  bsst  which  will  most  pro- 
mote this  good.  Nor  is  there  any  serious  difference  of  opinioq  as 
to  the  nature  of  the  good  to  be  had  in  view ;  it  is  in  a  word  the 
increase  of  the  national  wealth  and  prosperity.  The  question  on 
which  opinions  fundamentally  differ  is  that  of  the  effects  of  a  higher 
or  lower  rate  of  duty  upon  the  interests  of  the  public.  If  it  were 
possible  to  foresee,  with  an  approach  to  certainty,  what  effect  a  given 
tariff  would  have  upon  the  producers  and  consumers  of  an  article 
taxed,  and,  indirectly,  upon  each  member  of  the  community  in  any 


TO   SOOIAI,    I'ROORBStt. 


way  intoreHted  in  the  article,  wu  Hhoiild  thtui  have  an  exact  datum 
which  we  do  not  now  pofwess  for  re»(;hing  a  concluHion.  If  nonie 
superhuman  authority,  spcakiu)^  with  the  voice  of  infallibility, 
could  give  uh  thia  information,  it  w  evident  that  a  great  national 
want  would  be  supplied.  No  question  in  practical  life  is  more  im- 
portant than  this:  How  can  this  desirable  knowledge  of  the  econo- 
mic effects  of  a  tariff  be  obtained  ? 

The  answer  to  this  ijiiestion  is  clear  and  simple.  The  subject 
must  be  studied  in  the  sumo  spirit,  and,  to  a  certain  extent,  by 
the  same  methods  which  have  been  so  successful  in  advancing  our 
knowledge  of  nature.  Every  one  know>t  that,  within  the  last  two 
centuries,  a  method  of  studying  the  course  of  nature  has  been  in- 
troduced which  has  been  so  successful  in  enabling  us  to  trace  the 
sequence  of  cause  and  effect  as  almost  to  revolutionise  society.  The 
very  fact  that  scientific  method  has  been  so  successful  here  leads  to 
the  belief  that  it  might  be  equally  successful  in  othei  departments 
of  inquiry. 

The  same  remarks  will  apply  to  the  questions  connected  with 
banking  and  currency ;  the  standard  of  value ;  and,  indeed,  all 
subjects  which  have  a  'financial  bearing.  On  every  such  question 
we  see  wide 'differences  of  opinion  without  any  common  basis  to  rest 
upon. 

It  may  be  said,  in  reply,  that  in  these  cases  there  are  really  no 
grounds  for  forming  an  opinion,  and  that  the  contests  which  arise 
over  them  are  merely  those  between  conflicting  interests.  But  this 
claim  is  not  at  all  consonant  with  the  form  which  we  see  the  discus- 
sion assume.  Nearly  every  one  has  a  decided  opinion  on  these 
several  subjects ;  whereas,  if  there  were  Ho  data  for  forming  an 
opinion,  it  would  be  unreasonable  to  maintain  any  whatever.  In- 
deed, it  is  evident  that  there  must  b«  truth  somewhere,  and  the 
only  question  that  can  be  open  is  that  of  the  mode  of  discovering 
it.  No  man  imbued  with  a  scientific  spirit  can  claim  that  such 
truth  is  beyond  the  power  of  the  human  intellect.  He  may  doubt 
his  own  ability  to  grasp  it,  but  cannot  doubt  that  by  pursuing  the 
proper  method  and  adopting  the  best  means  the  problem  can  be 
solved.  It  is,  in  fact,  difficult  to  show  why  some  exact  results  could 
not  be  as  certainly  reached  in  economic  questions  as  in  those  of 
physical  science.  It  is  true  that  if  we  pursue  the  inquiry  far 
enough  we  shall  find  more  complex  conditions  to  encounter,  because 
the  future  course  of  demand  and  supply  enters  as  an  uncertain 


f 


THE    RELATION    OF  SCIENTIFIC    METHOD 


eleraeot.  But  a  remarkable  fact  to  be  considered  w  that  the  difler- 
ence  of  opinion  to  which  we  allude  does  not  depend  upon  different 
edtinaatea  of  the  future,  but  upou  different  views  of  the  most  element- 
ary and  general  principles  of  the  subject.  It  is  as  if  men  were  not 
agreed  whether  air  were  elastic  or  whether  the  earth  turns  on  its 
axis.  Why  is  it  that  while  in  all  subjects  of  physical  science  we 
find  a  general  at^reenieut  through  a  wide  range  of  subjects,  and  doubt 
commences  only  where  certainty  is  not  attained,  yet  when  we  turn 
to  economic  subjects*  we  do  not  fiud  the  beginning  of  an  agreement? 

No  two  answers  can  be  given.  It  is  because  the  two  classes  of 
subjects  are  investigated  by  different  instruments  and  in  a  different 
spirit.  The  physicist  has  an  exact  nomenclature ;  uses  methods  of 
research  well  adapted  to  the  objects  he  has  in  view  ;  pursues  his  in- 
vestigations without  being  attacked  by  those  who  wish  for  different 
results;  and,  above  all,  pursues  them  only  for  the  purpose  of  dis- 
covering the  truth.  In  economical  questions  the  cane  is  entirely 
different.  Only  in  rare  cases  are  they  studied  without  at  least  the 
suspicion  that  the  student  has  a  preconceived  theory  to  support.  If 
results  are  attained  which  oppose  any  powerful  interest,  this  interest 
can  hire  a  competing  investigator  to  bring  out  a  different  result. 
So  far  as  the  public  can  see,  one  man's  result  is  as  good  as  another's, 
and  thus  the  object  is  as  far  off  as  over.  We  may  be  sure  that  until 
there  is  an  intelligent  and  rational  public,  able  to  distinguish  be- 
tween the  speculations  of  the  charlatan  and  the  researches  of  the 
investigator,  the  present  state  of  things  will  continue.  What  we 
want  is  so  wide  a  diffusion  of  scientific  ideas  that  there  shall  be  a 
class  of  men  engaged  in  studying  economical  problems  for  their  own 
sake,  and  an  intelligent  public  able  to  judge  what  they  are  doing. 
There  must  be  an  improvement  in  the  objects  at  which  they  aim  in 
education,  and  it  is  now  worth  while  to  inquire  what  that  improve- 
ment is. 

It  is  not  mere  instruction  in  any  branch  of  technical  science  that 
is  wanted.  No  knowledge  of  chemistry,  physics,  or  biology,  how- 
ever extensive,  can  give  the  learner  much  aid  in  forming  a  cor- 
rect opinion  of  such  a  question  as  that  of  the  currency.  If  we 
should  claim  that  political  economy  ought  to  be  more  extensively 
studied,  we  would  be  met  by  the  question,  which  of  several  conflict- 
ing systems  shall  we  teach  ?  What  is  wanted  is  not  to  teach  this 
system  or  that,  but  to  give  such  a  training  that  the  student  shall  be 
able  to  decide  for  himself  which  system  is  right. 


TO   SOCIAL    PKOORKflS. 


! 


It  seeiDH  to  me  thaf  the  true  educational  want  is  ignored  both  bj 
those  who  advocate  a  classical  and  those  who  advocate  a  scientific 
education.  What  is  really  wautcd  is  to  train  the  intellectual  pow- 
ers, and  the  question  ought  to  be,  what  is  the  best  method  of  doing 
this?  Perhaps  it  might  be  found  that  both  of  the  conflicting 
methods  could  be  improved  upon.  The  really  distinctive  features, 
which  we  should  desire  to  see  introduced,  are  two  in  number :  the 
one  the  scientific  spirit;  the  other  the  scientific  discipline.  Al- 
though many  details  may  be  classified  under  each  of  these  heads, 
yet  there  is  one  of  pre-emiuent  importance  on  which  we  should 
insist. 

The  6ne  feature  of  the  scientific  spirit  which  outweighs  all  others 
in  importance  is  the  love  of  knowledge  for  its  own  sake.  If  by  our 
system  of  e<lucation  we  can  iuculcatu  this  sentiment  we  shall  do 
what  is,  from  a  public  point  of  view,  worth  more  than  any  amount 
of  technical  knowledge,  because  we  shall  lay  the  foundation  of  all 
knowledge.  So  long  as  men  study  only  what  they  think  is  going 
to  be  useful  their  knowledge  will  be  partial  and  insufficient.  I 
think  it  is  to  the  constant  inculcation  of  this  fact  by  experience, 
rather  than  to  any  reasoning,  that  is  due  the  continued  apprecia- 
tion of  a  liberal  education.  Every  business  man  knows  that  a 
business-college  training  is  of  very  little  account  in  enabling  one  to 
fight  the  battle  of  life,  and  that  college  bred  men  have  a  great  ad- 
vantage even  in  fields  where  mere  education  is  a  secondary  matter. 
We  are  accustomed  to  seeing  ridicule  thrown  upon  the  questions 
sometimes  asked  of  candidates  for  the  civil  service  because  the 
questions  refer  to  subjects  of  which  a  knowledge  is  not  essential. 
The  reply  to  all  criticisms  of  this  kind  is  that  there  is  no  one 
quality  which  more  certainly  assures  a  man's  usefulness  to  society 
than  the  propensity  to  acquire  useless  knowledge.  Most  of  our 
citizens  take  a  wide  interest  in  public  affairs,  else  our  form  of  gov- 
ernment would  be  a  failure.  But  it  is  desirable  that  their  study  of 
public  measures  should  be  more  critical  and  take  a  wider  range. 
It  is  especially  desirable  that  the  conclusions  to  which  they  are  led 
should  be  unafiTected  by  partisan  sympathies.  The  more  strongly 
the  love  of  mere  truth  is  inculcated  in  their  nature  the  better  this 
end  will  be  attained. 

The  scientific  discipline  to  which  I  ask  mainly  to  call  your  atten- 
tion consists  in  training  the  scholar  to  the  scientific  use  of  language. 
Although  whole  volumes  may  be  written  on  the  logic  of  scienee 


M  tl 


8 


THE   RELATION    OP   SCIENTIFIC   METHOD 


there  ia  one  general  feature  of  its  method  which  is  of  fundamental 
significance.  It  is  that  every  term  which  it  uses  and  every  propo- 
sition which  it  enunciates  has  a  precise  meaning  which  can  be 
made  evident  by  proper  definitions.  This  general  principle  of 
scientific  language  is  much  more  easily  inculcated  by  example  than 
subject  to  exact  description  ;  but  I  shall  ask  leave  to  add  one  to 
several  attempts  I  have  made  to  define  it.  If  I  should  say  that 
when  a  statement  is  made  in  the  language  of  science  the  speaker 
knows  what  he  means,  and  the  hearer  either  knows  it  or  can  be 
made  to  know  it  by  proper  definitions,  and  that  this  community  of 
understanding  is  frequently  not  reached  in  other  departments  of 
thought,  I  might  be  understood  as  casting  a  slur  on  whole  depart- 
menta  of  inquiry.  Without  intending  any  such  slur,  I  may  still 
say  that  language  and  statements  are  worthy  of  the  name  scientific 
as  they  approach  this  standard  ;  and,  moreover,  that  a  great  deal 
is  said  and  written  which  does  not  fulfill  the  requirement.  The 
fact  that  words  lose  their  meaning  when  removed  from  the  connec- 
tions in  which  that  meaning  has  been  acquired  and  put  to  higher 
uses,  is  one  which,  I  think,  is  rarely  recognized.  There  is  nothing 
in  the  history  of  philosophical  inquiry  more  curious  than  the  fre- 
quency of  interminable  disputes  on  subjects  where  no  agreement 
can  be  reached  because  the  opposing  parties  do  not  use  words  in 
the  same  sense.  That  the  history  of  science  is  not  free  from  this 
reproach  is  shown  by  the  fact  of  the  long  dispute  whether  the 
force  of  a  moving  body  was  proportional  to  the 'simple  velocity 
or  to  its  square.  Neither  of  the  parties  to  the  dispute  thought  it 
worth  while  to  define  what  they  meant  by  the  word  "force,"  and  it 
was  at  length  found  that  if  a  definition  was  agreed  upon  the  seem- 
ing difierence  of  opinion  would  vanish.  Perhaps  the  most  striking 
feature  of  the  case,  and  one  peculiar  to  a  scientific  dispute,  was  that 
the  opposing  parties  did  not  difier  in  their  solution  of  a  single 
mechanical  problem.  I  say  this  is  curious,  because  the  very  fact 
of  their  agreeing  upon  every  concrete  question  which  could  have 
been  presented,  ought  to  have  made  it  clear  that  some  fallacy  was 
lacking  in  the  discussion  as  to  the  measure  of  force.  The  good 
effect  of  a  scientific  spirit  is  shown  by  the  fact  that  this  discussion 
is  almost  unique  in  the  history  of  science  during  the  past  two  centu- 
ries, and  that  scientific  men  themselves  were  able  to  see  the  fallacy 
involved,  and  thus  to  bring  the  matter  to  a  conclusion. 
If  we  now  turn  to  the  discussions  of  philosophers,  we  shall  find  at 


!  r 


TO  SOCIAL  PROORESS. 


least  one  yet  more  strikinf;  example  of  the  same  kind.  The  ques- 
tion of  the  freedom  of  the  human  will  has,  I  believe,  raged  for  cen- 
turies. It  cannot  yet  be  said  that  any  conclusion  has  been  reached. 
Indeed  I  have  heard  it  admitted  by  men  of  high  intellectual  attain- 
ments that  the  question  was  insoluble.  Now  a  curious  feature  of 
this  dispute  is  that  none  of  the  combatants,  at  least  on  the  aflSrma- 
tive  side,  have  made  any  serious  attempt  to  define  what  should  be 
meant  by  the  phrase  freedom  of  the  will,  except  by  using  such  terms 
as  require  definition  equally  with  the  word  freedom  itself.  It  can, 
I  conceive,  be  made  quite  clear  that  the  assertion, "  The  will  is 
free,"  is  one  without  meaning,  until  we  analyze  more  fully  the  differ- 
ent mieanings  to  be  attached  to  the  word  free.  Now  this  word  has 
a  perfecdy  well-defined  signification  in  every  day  life.  We  say  that 
anything  is  free  when  it  is  not  subject  to  external  constraint.  We 
also  know  exactly  what  we  mean  when  we  say  that  a  man  is  free  to 
do  a  certain  act.  We  mean  that  if  he  chooses  to  do  it  there  is  no  ex- 
ternal constraint  acting  to  prevent  him.  In  all  cases  a  relation  of 
two  things  is  implied  in  the  word,  some  active  agent  or  power,  and 
the  presence  or  absence  of  another  constraining  agent.  Now,  when 
we  inquire  whether  the  will  itself  is  free,  irrespective  of  external 
constraints,  the  word  free  no  longer  has  a  meaning,  because  one  of 
the  elements  implied  in  it  is  ignored. 

To  inquire  whetiier  the  will  itself  is  free  is  like  inquiring  whether 
fire  itself  is  consumed  by  the  burning,  or  whether  clothing  is  itself 
clad.  It  is  not,  therefore,  at  all  surprising  that  both  parries  have 
been  able  to  dispute  without  end,  but  it  is  a  most  astonishing 
phenomenon  of  the  human  intellect  that  the  dispute  should  go  on 
generation  after  generation  without  the  parties  finding  out  whether 
there  was  really  any  difference  of  opinion  between  them  on  the 
subject  I  venture  to  say  that  if  there  is  any  such  difference,  neither 
party  has  ever  analyzed  the  meaning  of  the  words  used  sufficiently 
fifftoshowit.  Thedaily  experience  of  every  man,  from  his  cradle 
to  his  grave,  shows  that  human  acts  are  as  much  the  subject  of  ex- 
ternal causal  influences  as  are  the  phenomena  of  nature.  To  dis- 
pute tiiis  would  be  little  short  of  the  ludicrous.  All  that  the  oppo- 
nenti  of  freedom,  as  a  class,  have  ever  claimed,  is  the  assertion  of  a 
oaosal  connection  betwe«a  the  acts  of  the  will,  and  influences  inde- 
pendent of  the  will  True,  propositions  of  this  sort  can  be  expressed 
in  a  variety  of  ways  connoting  an  endless  number  of  more  or  less 
objeotimuible  ideas,  bat  this  is  the  substance  of  ihe  matter. 

2 


10 


THE  RBLAtlOK  OP  SOIENtlFIO  METHOD 


To  suppose  that  the  advocates  on  the  other  side  meant  to  take 
issue  on  Uiis  proposition  would  be  to  assume  that  they  did  not  know 
what  they  were  saying.  The  conclusion  forced  upon  us  is  that 
though  men  spend  their  whole  lives  in  the  study  of  the  most  ele- 
vated department  of  human  thought  it  does  not  guard  them  against 
the  danger  of  using  words  without  meaning.  It  would  be  a  mark 
of  ignorance,  rather  than  of  penetration,  to  hastily  denounce  propo- 
sitions on  subjects  we  are  not  well  acquainted  with  because  we  do 
not  understand  their  meaning.  I  do  not  mean  to  intimate  that 
philosophy  itself  is  subject  to  this  reproach.  When  we  see  a  philo- 
sophicd  proposition,  couched  in  terms  we  do  not  understand,  the 
most  modest  and  charitable  view  is  to  assume  that  this  arises  from 
our  lack  of  knowledge.  Nothing  is  easier  than  for  the  ignorant  to 
ridicule  the  propositions  of  the  learned.  And  yet,  with  every  re- 
serve, I  cannot  but  feel  that  the  disputes  to  which  I  have  alluded 
prove  the  necessity  of  bringing  scientific  precision  of  language  into 
every  demand  of  diought.  If  the  discussion  had  been  confined  to 
a  few,  and  other  philosophers  had  analyzed  the  subject,  and  showed 
the  fictitious  character  of  the  discussion,  or  had  pointed  out  where 
opinions  really  might  differ,  there  would  be  nothing  derogatory  to 
philosophers.  But  the  most  suggestive  circumstance  is  that  although 
a  large  proportion  of  the  philosophic  writers  in  recent  times  have 
devoted  more  or  less  attention  to  the  subject,  few,  or  none,  have  made 
even  this  modest  contribution.  I  speak  with  some  little  confidence 
on  this  subject,  because  several  years  ago  I  wrote  to  one  of  the  most 
acute  thinkers  of  the  country,  asking  if  he  could  find  in  philoso- 
phical literature  any  terms  or  definitions  expressive  of  the  three 
different  senses  in  which  not  only  the  word  freedom,  but  nearly  all 
words  implying  freedom  were  used.    His  search  was  in  vain. 

Nothing  of  this  sort  occurs  in  the  practical  affairs  of  life.  AH 
terms  used  in  business,  however  general  or  abstract,  have  that  well- 
defined  meaning  which  is  the  first  requisite  of  the  scientific  lan- 
guage. Now  one  important  lesson  which  I  wish  to  inc  1  (»te  is  that 
the  language  of  science  in  this  respect  corresponds  to  that  of  buri- 
ness ;  in  that  each  and  every  term  that  is  employed  has  a  meaning 
as  well  defined  as  the  subject  of  discussion  can  admit  of.  It  will  be 
an  instructive  exercise  to  inquire  what  this  peculiarity  of  sdoitifie 
and  business  language  is.  It  can  be  shown  that  a  certain  re- 
quirement should  be  fulfilled  by  all  language  intended  fer  the 
disGoyery  of  truth,  which  is  fiilfiUed  only  by  the  two  olawM  of 


'    .■Ai«M'^«MHl.ll»*Jfci.i 


mmtondtaamm 


TO   SOCIAL   PROGRESS. 


11 


language  which  I  have  described.  It  is  one  of  the  most  common 
errors  of  discourse  to  assumt  that  any  common  expression  which 
we  may  use  always  conveys  an  idea,  no  matter  what  the  subject  of 
discourse.  The  true  state  of  the  case  can,  perhaps,  best  be  seen  by 
beginning  at  the  foundation  of  things,  and  examining  under  what 
conditions  language  can  really  convey  ideas. 

Suppose  thrown  among  us  a  person  of  well-developed  intellect, 
but  unacquainted  with  a  single  language  or  word  that  we  use.  It 
is  absolutely  useless  to  talk  to  him,  because  nothing  that  we  say 
conveys  any  meaning  to  his  mind.  We  can  supply  him  no  dic- 
tionary, because  by  hypothesis  he  knows  no  language  to  which  we 
have  access.  Huw  shall  we  proceed  to  communicate  our  ideas  to 
him?  Clearly  there  is  but  one  possible  way,  namely,  through  his 
five  senses.  Outside  of  this  means  of  bringing  him  in  contact  with 
us  we  can  have  no  communication  with  him.  We,  therefore,  begin 
by  showing  him  sensible  objects,  and  letting  him  understand  that 
certain  words  which  we  use  correspond  to  those  objects.  After  he 
has  thus  acquired  a  small  vocabulary,  we  make  him  understand 
that  other  terms  refer  to  relations  between  objects  which  he  can  per- 
ceive by  his  senses.  N'ext  he  learns,  by  induction,  that  there  are 
terms  which  apply  nut  to  special  objects,  but  to  whole  classes  of 
objects.  G)ntinuing  the  same  process,  he  learns  that  there  are  cer- 
tain attributes  of  objects  made  known  by  the  manner  in  which  they 
affect  his  senses,  to  which  abstract  terms  are  applied.  Having 
learned  all  this,  we  can  teach  him  new  words  by  combining  words 
without  exhibiting  objects  already  known.  Using  these  words  we 
can  proceed  yet  further,  building  up,  as  it  were,  a  complete  lan- 
guage. But  there  is  one  limit  at  every  step.  Every  term  which 
we  make  known  to  him  must  depend  ultimately  upon  terms  the 
meaning  of  which  he  has  learned  from  their  connection  with  special 
objects  of  sense. 

To  communicate  to  him  a  knowledge  of  words  expressive  of 
mental  states  it  is  necessary  to  assume  that  his  own  mind  is  subject 
to  these  states  as  well  as  our  own,  and  that  we  can  in  some  way  in- 
dicate them  by  our  acts.  That  the  former  hypothesis  is  sufficiently 
well  established  can  be  made  evident  so  long  as  a  consistency  of 
different  words  and  ideas  is  maintained.  If  no  such  consistency  of 
meaning  on  his  part  were  evident,  it  might  indicate  that  the  opera- 
tions of  his  mind  were  so  different  from  ours  that  no  such  commu- 
nioation  of  ideas  was  possible.    Uncertainty  in  this  respect  must 


■iinin*»iiiWiMi.MT-^ 


12 


THE   RELATION   OF   SCIENTIFIC    METHOD 


ariae  as  soon  as  we  go  beyond  those  mental  states  whirh  commani- 
cate  themselves  to  the  senses  of  others. 

We  now  see  that  in  order  to  commanicate  to  our  foreigner  a 
knowledge  of  language,  we  must  follow  rules  similar  to  those  ne- 
cessary for  the  stability  of  a  building.  The  foundation  of  the  build- 
ing must  be  well  laid  upon  objects  knowable  by  his  five  senses.  Of 
course  the  mind,  as  well  as  the  external  object,  may  be  a  fiictor  in 
determining  the  ideas  which  the  words  are  intended  to  express ;  but 
this  does  not  in  any  manner  invalidate  the  conditions  which  we  im- 
pose. Whatever  theory  we  may  adopt  of  the  relative  part  played 
by  the  knowing  subject,  and  the  external  object  in  the  acquirement 
of  knowledge,  it  remains  none  the  less  true  that  no  knowledge  of 
the  meaning  of  a  word  can  be  acquired  except  through  the  senses, 
and  that  the  meaning  is,  therefore,  limited  by  the  senses.  If  we 
transgress  the  rule  of  founding  each  meaning  upon  meanings  below 
it,  and  having  the  whole  ultimately  resting  upon  a  sensuous  founda- 
tion, we  at  once  branch  off  into  sound  without  sense.  We  may 
teach  him  the  use  of  an  extended  vocabulary,  to  the  terms  of  which 
he  may  apply  ideas  of  his  own,  more  or  less  vague,  but  there  will 
be  no  way  of  deciding  that  he  attaches  the  same  meaning  to  these 
terms  that  we  do. 

What  we  have  shown  true  of  an  intelligent  foreigner  is  neces- 
sarily true  of  the  growing  man.  We  come  into  the  world  with- 
out a  knowledge  of  the  meaning  of  words,  and  can  acquire  such 
knowledge  only  by  a  process  which  we  have  found  applicable  to 
the  intelligent  foreigner.  But  to  confine  ourselves  within  these 
limits  in  the  use  of  language  requires  a  course  of  severe  mental  dis- 
cipline. The  transgression  of  the  rule  will  naturally  seem  to  the 
undisciplined  mind  a  mark  of  intellectual  vigor  rather  than  the  re- 
verse. In  our  system  of  education  every  temptation  is  held  out  to 
the  Ittumer  to  transgress  the  rule  by  the  fluent  use  of  language  to 
which  it  is  doubtful  if  he  himself  attaches  clear  notions,  and  which 
he  can  never  be  certain  suggests  to  his  hearer  the  ideas  which  he 
intends.  Indeed,  we  not  infrequently  see,  even  among  practical 
educators,  expressions  of  positive  antipathy  to  scientific  precision  of 
language  so  obviously  opposed  to  good  sense  that  they  can  be 
attributed  only  to  a  failure  to  comprehend  the  meaning  of  the  lan- 
guage which  tiiey  criticise. 

Perhaps  the  most  injurious  effect  in  this  direction  arises  firom 
(lie  natural  tendency  of  the  mind,  when  not  subject  to  a  scientific 


fiu',::. 


'--J, 


TO  SOCIAL   PR0OKB8S. 


18 


•ommani- 

reigner  a 

those  ne- 

the  build- 

Dses.    Of 

factor  in 

)ress ;  but 

ch  we  im- 

irt  played 

luirement 

twltidge  of 

;he  senses, 

».    If  we 

ngs  below 

IS  founda- 

We  may 

B  of  which 

there  will 

ig  to  these 

'  is  neces- 
Drld  with- 
luire  such 
plicable  to 
thin  these 
aental  dis- 
em  to  the 
lan  the  re- 
I  eld  out  to 
nguage  to 
ind  which 
which  he 
practical 
recision  of 
»y  can  be 
>f  the  Ian- 
rises  from 
i  sdentifie 


''"--Ur*,-*     -^ 


discipline,  to  think  of  words  expressing  sensible  objects  and  their 
relations  as  connoting  certain  supersensuous  attributes.  This  is  fre- 
quently seen,  in  the  repugnance  of  the  metaphysical  mind  to  receive 
a  scientific  statement  about  a  matter  of  fiust  simply  as  a  matter  of 
fact.  This  repugnance  does  not  generally  arise  in  respect  to  the 
every  day  matters  of  life.  When  we  say  that  the  earUi  is  round 
we  state  a  truth  which  every  one  is  willing  to  receive  as  final.  If 
without  denying  that  the  earfh  was  round,  one  should  criticise  the 
statement  on  the  ground  that  it  was  not  necessarily  round  but 
might  be  of  some  other  form,  we  should  simply  smile  at  this  use  pf 
language.  But  when  we  take  a  more  general  statement  and  assert 
that  the  laws  of  nature  are  inexorable,  and  that  all  phenomona, 
so  far  as  we  can  show,  occur  in  obedience  to  their  requirements,  we 
are  met  with  a  sort  of  criticism  with  which  all  of  us  are  familiar, 
and  which  I  am  unable  adequately  to  describe.  No  one  duties 
that  as  a  matter  of  fact,  and  as  far  as  his  experience  extends,  these 
laws  do  appear  to  be  inexorable.  I  have  never  heard  of  any  one 
professing,  during  the  present  generation,  to  describe  a  natural 
phenomenon,  with  the  aVowed  belief  that  it  was  not  a  product  of 
natural  law ;  yet  we  constantly  hear  the  scientific  view  criticised  on 
the  ground  that  events  may  occur  without  being  subject  to  natural 
law.  The  word  "  may,"  in  this  connection,  is  one  to  which  we  can 
attach  no  meaning  expressive  of  a  sensuous  relation. 

This  is,  however,  not  the  most  frequent  misuse  of  the  word  may. 
In  fact,  the  unscientific  use  of  language  to  which  I  refer,  is  most 
strongly  shown  in  disquisitions  on  the  freedom  of  the  will.  When 
I  say  that  it  is  perfectly  certain  that  I  will  to-morrow  perform  a 
certain  act  unless  some  cause  external  to  my  mind  which  I  do  not 
now  foresee  occurs  to  prevent  me,  I  make  a  statement  which  is  final 
so  far  as  scientific  ideas  are  concerned.  But  it  will  sometimes  be 
maintained  that  however  certain  it  may  be  that  I  shall  perform 
this  act,  nevertheless  I  may  act  otherwise.  All  I  can  say  to  this  is 
that  I  do  not  understand  the  meaning  of  the  statement. 

The  analogous  conflict  between  the  scientific  use  of  language  and 
the  use  made  by  some  philosophers,  is  found  in  connection  with 
the  idea  of  causation.  Fundamentally  the  word  cause  is  used 
in  soientifio  language  in  the  same  sense  as  in  the  language  of  com- 
mon life.  When  we  discuss  with  our  neighbors  the  cause  of  a  fit 
of  illness,  of  a  fire,  or  of  cold  weather,  not  the  slightest  ambiguity 
attaches  to  the  use  of  the  word,  because  whatever  meaning  may 


THE  RELATION  OF  SCIENTIFIC   METHOD 

be  g^ven  to  it  is  founded  only  on  an  accurate  analysis  of  the  ideas 
involyed  in  it  from  driily  use.  No  philosopher  objects  to  the  com- 
mon meaning  of  the  vrord,  yet  we  frequently  find  men  of  eminence 
in  the  intellectual  >vorld  who  will  not  tolerate  the  scientific  man 
in  using  the  word  in  this  way.  In  every  explanation  which  he 
can  give  to  its  use  they  detect  ambiguity.  They  insist  that  in 
any  proper  use  of  the  term  the  idea  of  power  must  be  connoted. 
But  what  meaning  is  here  attached  to  the  word  power,  and  how 
shall  we  first  reduce  it  to  a  sensible  form,  and  then  apply  its  mean- 
ing to  the  operations  of  nature?  That  this  can  be  done,  I  by  no 
means  deny.  All  I  maintain  is  that  if  we  shall  do  it,  we  must  pass 
without  the  domain  of  scientific  statement. 

Perhaps  the  greatest  advantage  in  the  use  of  symbolic  and  other 
mathematical  language  in  scientific  investigation  is  that  it  cannot  pos- 
sibly be  made  to  connote  anything  except  what  the  speaker  means. 
It  adheres  to  the  subject  matter  of  discourse  with  a  tenacity  which 
no  criticism  can  overcome.  In  consequence,  whenever  a  science 
is  reduced  to  a  mathematical  form  its  conclusions  are  no  longer 
the  subject  of  philosophical  attack.  To  secure  the  same  desirable 
quality  in  all  other  sciratiSc  language  it  is  necessary  to  give  it,  so 
fiir  as  possible,  the  same  simplicity  of  signification  which  attaches 
io  mathematical  symbols.  Tliis  is  not  easy,  because  we  are  obliged 
to  use  words  of  ordinary  language,  and  it  is  impossible  to  divest 
them  of  whatever  they  may  connote  to  ordinary  bearers. 
'  I  have  thus  sought  to  make  it  clear  that  the  language  of  science 
corresponds  to  that  of  ordinary  life,  and  especially  of  business  life, 
in  confining  its  meaning  to  phenomena.  An  analogous  statement 
may  be  made  of  the  method  and  objects  of  scientific  investigation. 
I  think  Professor  CliflTord  was  very  happy  in  defining  science  as 
organiased  common  sense.  The  foundation  of  its  widest  general 
creations  is  laid,  not  in  any  artificial  theories,  but  in  the  natural 
belieft  and  tendencies  of  the  human  mind.  Its  position  against 
those  who  deny  these  generalizations  is  quite  analogous  to  that  taken 
by  the  Scottish  school  of  philosophy  against  the  skepticism  of 
Hume. 

It  may  be  asked,  if  the  methods  and  language  of  science  corres- 
pond to  those  of  practical  life,— why  is  not  the  every  day  discipline 
of  that  life  as  good  as  the  discipline  of  science?  The  Ruswer  is, 
that  the  power  of  transferring  the  modes  of,  thought  of  common 
life  to  subjects  of  a  higher  order  of  geuerality  is  a  rare  faculty 


I 


wiS»^»mmmiiat0»mmUmtm 


Mastjftn*"'^ 


To  SOCIAL  PBOOltBSS. 


16 


which  can  be  acquired  only  by  scientific  discipline.  What  we  want 
is  that  in  public  affairs  men  shall  reason  about  questions  of  finance, 
trade,  national  wealth,  legislation  and  administration  with  the  same 
consciousness  of  the  practical  side  that  they  reason  about  their  own 
interests.  When  this  habit  is  once  acquired  and  appreciated,  the 
scientific  method  will  naturally  be  applied  to  the  study  of  questions 
of  social  policy.  When  a  scientific  interest  is  taken  in  such  ques- 
tions, their  boundaries  will  be  extended  beyond  the  utilities  imme- 
diately involved,  and  then  the  last  condition  of  unceasing  progress 
will  be  complied  with. 


( 


iTiiiiiiiHniliiWiiilni-iiilir.;!' 


